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Introduction:
Why Do We Care About Art?
By ALBERT ELSEN*
DURENG wartime a cathedral is being used by troops as an observA-
tion post and the attacking force must decide whether to preserve the
country's national treasure or risk numerous casualties. Which should
weigh more heavily in the balance, human life or great works of art?
Occupied territory contains an acrchaeological site precious to victor and
vanquished. Who owns the past? What price for its recovery in terms
of the destruction of homes and displacement of persons to excavate the
site? An enthusiastic museum director in a capitalist nation acquires a
great sculptural relief from a Pre-Columbian site in a country whose
citizens cannot trace a direct ancestry to the civilization that produced
the illegally exported sculpture. Of what importance is a three thou-
sand year old relief to a nation most of whose citizens are unaware of or
indifferent to what is called their heritage? An artist paints four sides
of a refrigerator for a client, and later they are sold separately. Why
should society and the law care when the artist protests that the integrity
of his art and personality have been violated? The executor of a sculp-
tor's estate has paint removed from one of the decedent's unfinished
works. If truth is at stake, shouldn't we care? These and many more
similar questions of a legal and ethical nature are treated by the writers
in this issue.
For an art historian it is refreshing to see how jurists and other
legal scholars have answered the question of why we should care about
* B.A., 1949, M.A., 1951, Ph.D., 1955, Columbia University. Walter A. Haas
Professor of Art History, Stanford University. The author was recently president of the
College Art Association and supervised the drafting of its Code of Ethics and Guidelines
for the Professional Practice of Art History. As a Rodin scholar he has for many years
been involved with the detection and exposure of forgeries of that artist's work. With
John Merryman he teaches a course on "Art and the Law" in the Stanford School of
Law. They are coauthors of a forthcoming text, Law, Ethics and the Visual Arts.
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art. Only since the 19th century have the courts, nations, and interna-
tional bodies concerned themselves with art's protection. The seculari-
zation and democratization of art itself in recent times has been accom-
panied by growing sophistication on the part of the public about its own
interest in culture. This public self-interest has been manifested and
often anticipated through judicial decisions, the passage of laws, and the
signing of international treaties. Partly by being "the last hand-made,
personal objects within our culture,"' in Meyer Schapiro's words, a work
of art can be a simple but potent reminder of the creativity so prized by
humanity. A French jurist recognized "the superior interest of the
human genius" that creates art. Art's uniqueness in terms of irreplacea-
bility and its capacity so often to survive its maker, his society, and the
ages account for its being valued more than as a mere chattel. The old
adage that "Art is long, and life is short" is still apt. For scientists and
scholars even a minor work from the past encapsulates religious, politi-
cal, social, economic, and technological systems. Preserving the art of
the past is essential to knowledge and wisdom. A work of art can also
exist out of time for an artist and connoisseur. It may inspire a new
work of art and be an ageless testimony to beauty. On a more mystical
level, in the past a great work of art was thought at times to contain the
mana of its royal owner. From Nero to Napoleon, rulers would plunder
art to capture the soul or mystical identity of its royal or urban owner.
That magical mana or life spirit contained in art is now seen as belong-
ing to a nation. (The Germans in 1914 bombarded cathedrals to break
the French spirit.) As in China and Israel, an artistic heritage is a
country's identity card for the present and passport to the future. Art
tells us who we are and where we came from. As if in answer to John
Steinbeck's question in the Grapes of Wrath, "How will we know its us
without our past?," America has finally begun to withhold its heritage
from the wrecker and bulldozer, and from the claims of profit and
progress.
Often it is art that is a powerful force for uniting a society.
Repeatedly in the following articles we read such terms as "in the public
interest," or "of national importance" used to justify the protection and
even confiscation of important works of art by the state. The inspira-
tional power of art of the past and present is crucial in newer countries,
such as Poland, that call for the development of a national culture and
give to their citizens a constitutionally guaranteed right to culture.
1. Schapiro, The Liberating Quality of Avant-Garde Art, ART NEWS, Summer,
1957, at 36, 38.
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Even American law has recognized that art can exist "for the inspira-
tion and benefit of the People." In Britain the criteria for exporting a
major work of art are eloquent on the subject: "[1] Is the object so
closely connected with our history and national life that its departure
would be a misfortune? [2] Is it of outstanding aesthetic importance?
[3] Is it of outstanding significance for the study of a some particular
branch of art, learning or history?"2
Andr6 Malraux once commented that there are two kinds of
art: that which belongs to the country of its origin and that which
belongs to mankind. Only as recently as the 1954 Hague convention
did an international body formulate claims for art that dissolve these
distinctions: "Damage to cultural property belonging to any people
whatsoever means damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind, since
each person makes its contribution to the culture of the world."
The Artist Is Never Alone
Physically, socially, spiritually, and esthetically the artist may think
of himself as solitary, alienated, unloved, or unwanted, but in today's
world no artist can ever be alone. When an artist creates a work of art
for himself, a host of people and institutions are involved. No matter
how resolutely the painter determines to make a work exclusively for her
own purposes, the resulting creation inevitably becomes part of the
systems that make up and intersect with the art world. Well-known to
this readership and as the essays in this issue demonstrate, the law is
involved even before as well as after the artist has finished a drawing,
print, painting, or sculpture, whether she knows it or not. The first
amendment protects her expression as well as the right of the critic to
assail it. How well the work of art is made and what it is made of
interest insurance investigators, as these factors will determine its lon-
gevity and the degree of joy or grief for curators and restorers, for their
museums' insurance does not cover damage from "inherent vice."
Under United States common law copyright and European moral
right, no one other than the artist can determine when the work is
finished and when it shall be exhibited or sold out of the studio to a
dealer or collector. The moment the artist puts the copyright notice on
the work, federal law enters the studio by defending her monopoly over
reproduction rights. When the artist has been supported by a federal or
2. Nie6, Legislative Models of Protection of Cultural Property, 27 HAsTNGS LJ.
1089, 1097 (1976), quoting REvmwING COMMITTE ON THE EXPORT OF WoRms oF ART,
SIXTEENTH REPORT Cmnd. No. 4244 (1969).
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state arts council grant, in the future he may face the question of
whether a personal copyright can be claimed. Only the moral right of
civil law countries guarantees to the artist that the work will remain as
she last saw it and not be altered or transformed by others.
In certain countries, if, in the judgment of art historians, the artist
has achieved considerable distinction, after death his art can be regis-
tered as a national treasure and prohibited from export. Even a rela-
tively unknown artist's work is part of her culture's heritage and could
eventually be seen by scholars as indispensable to the understanding of
her time and place, and of importance to future generations. Interna-
tional treaties protect the work of art even in the studio from confisca-
tion during war and provide in some cases for its repatriation and
restoration to the proper owners in peacetime. According to the Hague
convention, every time the artist makes his mark, he contributes to
world culture. The artist's studio is always crowded.
This collection of essays broadly divides between those that focus
on the rights and interests of the artist and those that concentrate on the
protection of the work of art.
The Protection of the Artist's Interests
Though fiercely proud of his individuality, Michelangelo did not
think of his art as self-expression. Successive popes did not look upon
his Last Judgment as a manifestation of Michelangelo's personality, but
ordered it altered and almost destroyed because it violated church
dogma and ideals of decorum. Until the 19th century, art was generally
valued for its content, for the skill of the artist or the miracles of his
hand, and for its demonstration of God-given genius or of divine
inspiration. (Secularized today, the term "inspiration" goes back to the
Greeks and means the breath of the gods.) While they credited
individuality, we do not find older commentators on art acknowledging
that art reflects the artist's personality. That recognition had to wait for
the positivist and Freudian age. Thus the concept of self-expression is
historically recent in art, originating in the last century, when pioneering
modernists such as the Impressionists took it upon themselves to work
from personal experience in individually acquired styles rather than by
interpreting the experience of others in academically approved modes.
With the development of abstract art early in this century, artists looked
for art's sources in the self. They radically changed the conditions of
art in order to capture the unique qualities of their private vision, and
this change resulted in the creation of the very vocabulary and grammar
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of their art. Painters such as Kandinsky could look upon their art as
creations and as intimate extensions of themselves. Picasso saw his art
as a diary. Readers of Joyce Carey's The Horse's Mouth will recall the
internal basis of Gulley Jimson's astonishing murals. By extension, the
modern artist's work, grounded in the self, becomes a tangible manifes-
tation of his personality. In view of their country's early leadership in
modem art, it is not surprising that by the mid-19th century French
jurists began to recognize and protect this intimate relationship between
the artist and the work of art.
In The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, John Merryman argues for
the adoption by the American legal system of ways to protect the
integrity of a work of art that is part of the moral right of the artist,
which in civil law doctrine is classified as a right of personality, as
distinguished from patrimonial or property rights. Many artists in this
country mistakenly believe that copyright laws protect their works from
distortion or dismemberment, whereas they have only a temporary
monopoly on the rights to the works' reproduction. Professor Merry-
man discusses several cases in French and English law involving artists
whose works were in one way or another altered or destroyed. Focus-
ing on the right of integrity, he discusses one Italian, one German, and
some French decisions that in his view have been misapplied by Ameri-
can writers to defend the notion that existing laws in this country
adequately protect the artist's moral rights. One of the most important
questions Merryman discusses is whether or not total destruction of a
work of art, as distinguished from its distortion or mutilation, violates
the artist's moral right. While the courts have not clearly resolved the
question, some decisions have held that total loss does not damage the
artist's reputation. Among the arguments Merryman presents to show
total destruction as prejudicial to moral right is that it nullifies other
rights of the artist that the laws ordinarily protect. The question is of
considerable importance at this moment in the United States with the
flowering of urban mural art, for example. Recently in Los Angeles a
number of striking murals executed by a team of artists known as the
L.A. Fine Arts Squad were covered over by property owners, and their
authors have no recourse under present law, as the entire notion of the
moral right of the artist does not exist in the United States. To an art
historian even a lost work's survival by the best reproduction diminishes
the artist's reputation because the serious judgment of quality depends
on confrontation with the work itself. When all is said and done, an
artist's standing in history depends on the quality of all his work, not
just his most celebrated pieces.
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Merryman shows that the moral right, by protecting individual
interests, is also serving the collective interest of the public, which
desires the opportunity to see the work as the artist intended it, "undis-
torted and 'unimproved' by the unilateral action of others." 3 At issue is
the right of an artisfs executor to alter unfinished work on the grounds
that whether the artist would have agreed or not, the executor's judg-
ment should prevail. The arrogance of the executor of the sculptor
David Smith's estate is today possible only in this country. Merryman
writes eloquently, "We yearn for the authentic, for contact with the work
in its true version and we resent and distrust anything that misrepresents
it."4 He is expressing our sentiments before Michelangelo's Last Judg-
ment fresco in the Vatican, which, under papal orders, experienced
drastic changes at the hands of other artists, beginning even in Michel-
angelo's lifetime. History shows us that artists as well as unsympathetic
property owners have been responsible for the distortion and mutilation
of important works of art. If moral rights laws are enacted, some of my
art historian colleagues are concerned that we will never be able to do
away with bad art.
Merryman attributes the moral right laws in civil law countries to
the longstanding traditions of great art in Europe. In contrast, only
since World War II have our artists in significant number achieved
international prominence and acclaim. As he puts it, "Legal change
usually lags behind social and cultural change,"5 and our laws have a lot
of catching up to do with respect to art.
The history of modern art is that of the artist's hard won freedom
from control by the Church and State. Rather than be a public rela-
tions arm of establishments, artists in the last century chose to celebrate
their own values even if they received in return only the freedom to
starve. Contributions to culture meant more to modernists than service
to king and bishop. To an art historian who has observed the painful
growth and hardiness of modem art without government nourishment,
and how state domination in Russia and Nazi Germany steered art into
mediocrity, there is more than a little irony in the enthusiasm with which
contemporary artists, politicians, and more recently legal scholars clam-
or for greater governmental involvement in the arts. Picasso never had
a grant from a national endowment, and Matisse was not given an
3. Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27 HAsTnGs _J. 1023, 1041
(1976).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1042.
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exhibition by the French government until more than fifteen years after
his death. Many major European and American artists were victims of
government, as were Max Beckman, Egon Schiele, Chagall, Kandinsky,
and Ben Shahn, to name a few. In this country advocates of govern-
ment support for the artist can pridefully point to the role of the WPA in
helping the young Gorky, de Kooning, Pollock, and Rothko to continue
to be artists at crucial times in their development. But even more major
American artists did not have incomes guaranteed by the government.
The major artists in California have so far achieved national and inter-
nal eminence without state or federal aid.
In Monroe Price's genuinely provocative essay, the only two impor-
tant questions he does not raise are whether government should be in
any way involved with the arts and whether its recent history of support
has improved the quality of art along with admittedly making life easier
for many deserving artists. Price not only assumes that it is right for the
government to support the arts as it has in the past, but, showing the
creativity of the artists he admires, he comes up with a staggering list of
important new areas in which the state should involve itself. Perhaps
Price's confidence in government support of the arts -today is based on
the good record of the National Endowment for the Arts.
"The proper role of the state in supporting the arts is still unchart-
ed"" and "this is an appropriate time to try to redefine the state role" is
Price's introduction to his State Arts Councils: Some Items for a New
Agenda. His specific concern is an inquiry into the proper role of the
state and the proper questions a state arts council might ask from the
perspective of the legal structure. At a time when visual artists are
being encouraged to overcome their ignorance of or antipathy to copy-
right, Price questions whether the copyright is still an encouragement to
creativity and whether that encouragement "is offset by the cost to the
community of less than a free access to the creation." He feels that
particularly in the realm of ideas there is a social interest in widespread
dissemination and encouragement of entrepreneurship in publication.
Since Price tries to encompass all of the arts in his essay, those like
myself more acquainted with the visual arts will have some problems in
seeing the relevance or merit of arguments made with respect to remov-
ing copyright for writers to satisfy "'the social interest in widespread
6. Price, State Arts Councils: Some Items for a New Agenda, 27 HAsrims LJ.
1183 (1976).
7. Id. at 1184.
8. Id. at 1187.
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dissemination [of ideas] and in encouraging entrepreneurship in publi-
cation."9  Stripping artists of royalties under copyright would remove
their only incentive to use it, for copyright does not protect the integrity
of a painting or sculpture, as Merryman points out in arguing for moral
rights legisation. Price asks, "Should the state propose a fund in lieu of
copyright that would support artists generally rather than reward a given
artist in particular?"'10 Many artists of my acquaintance would object to
the freeloading implications of an affirmative answer if -the funds came
from government owned copyright of artists' works.
Price's questions are often posed from the standpoint of the public
which pays the taxes that state arts councils channel to artists, as when
he asks about the public right to exhibition of an important work which
is in a private collection but which would be of importance to the
community at large." Mindful of the difficulties researchers and cura-
tors have in gaining access to privately held works of art and to
important works which are part of "the body of society's cultural
wealth,"' 2 Price asks why there should not be the "right of [reasonable]
access for important exhibitions and scholarly purposes."'13 He discuss-
es the various implications of a "right of access," ranging from protect-
ing the cultural patrimony of the state and limiting export of art to
possibly benefiting curators and broadening the basis of museum trustee
selection. Unflinching before any question, Price hypothesizes a situa-
tion for arts council inquiry in which the owner of a work of art could
avoid its exhibition only by the payment of a tax. If enacted, this
proposal could kill collecting and several museum directors.
Price also feels that state attorneys general should not be the only
watchdogs of charitable trusts and that a state arts council should "be
responsible for inspecting the efficiency of museums and recommending
ways of improving their policies and thereby their peformance."' 4  The
article reviews the state of broadened bases of beneficiaries and their
right to litigate against trustees, and Price suggests that the state review
the tax-exempt status of cultural institutions such as museums with
respect to employment practices, self-perpetuating boards of public
institutions, admissions policies, and acquisition practices which might
contravene federal policy expressed in statutes or treaty. In calling for
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See id. at 1188-90.
12. Id. at 1188.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1191.
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study of museum governance, Price argues that "it is wrong to have a
system of museums dependent on wealth, just as it would be wrong to
have a system of public education dependent on wealth."' 15
An historian must here point out that we have both public and
private museums and that without private wealth we would not have
such great museums as the Museum of Modern Art, the Metropolitan
Museum of Art, the Morgan Library, and the Guggenheim and Cleve-
land art museums, to name a few. European countries lack compara-
ble private museums, and outside of Paris and London, provincial
museums usually live up to their name. Price's next point does not
necessarily require the fulfillment of its predecessor. Price urges, "The
critical point is to develop a tradition in which collection and donation
of gifts to museums are not accompanied by expectations of control."' 6
He may have oversimplified and underestimated the system we now
have, as significant donations have been made without requirements of
donor control, especially in the case of university museums.
Professor Price's intimate personal involvement with art and artist
as well as their audience is reflected in the last section of miscellaneous
questions which presuppose the state's pluralistic commitment to the
arts. These questions demonstrate creative rather than the historically
restrictive ways by which the state could replace the old throne and altar
as patrons of the arts by ensuring art's presence in every major new
building, informing artists of their rights and advising on contracts,
devising new ways of building public collections of contemporary art
freer of "idiosyncratic and individual taste,"' 7 and restoring to the artist
deductions at fair market value from taxes for donation of works to tax-
supported institutions.
Price's coda is a welcome answer to the question of why we care
about art and artists and how they enhance our humanity. I would add
to Price's suggestions regarding tax reform that the state as well as the
federal government consider accepting works of art in lieu of cash for
death taxes as a means of benefiting artists' estates and building public
collections of contemporary art. The number and quality of Professor
Price's questions are unfortunately unmatched by the qualifications,
interest, and activities of the past membership of California's State Arts
Commission.
15. Id. at 1199.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1202.
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Protecting the Work of Art
World art has never been as accessible as it is today, and we are all
familiar with the astonishing attendance figures of art exhibitions from
China, Russia, and France, which suggest the public's yearning for this
contact. Less well-known is that in the last two years there has proba-
bly not been a single major art exhibition that did not require a
substantial financial grant from the federal government or private corpo-
rations. While public interest in museums is at its highest, many of our
museums are fast reaching the lowest points in their financial histories,
are forced to close more than one day a week, and must curtail their
exhibition schedules. Many ingredients combine to create this dismal
picture, but one of the most detrimental to the future of major exhibi-
tions is the soaring cost of insurance coverage. Given the value on the
world art market of the great paintings and sculptures involved, if there
had been a high incidence of loss through theft and destruction of these
works on loan, one might accept huge insurance premiums. Professor
Irving Pfeffer has made a major contribution by exposing the unjustified
rates hard-pressed museums must pay, and, more important, he offers a
compelling alternative.
One of the areas not mentioned by Professor Price into which a
state arts council might look is that of the state's insurance of major
exhibitions held within its borders. Although aimed at the federal level,
Irving Pfeffer's richly informative essay, The Insurance of Museum
Exhibitions, provides arguments for state subventions for what the
author rightly terms "one of the major forces of cultural expression in
the United States, with a mass audience which numbers in the hundreds
of millions every year."' 8 For art historians as well as lawyers who
work for museums or are being trained for museum work, this
article is a primer in how to cope with the soaring costs of mount-
ing major art exhibitions. Our ignorance (and that of many boards
of trustees composed of businessmen) of insurance practice has
made us fair game for insurance companies who, despite the facts, con-
sider art exhibitions "high risk insurance exposures."'19 What will be
depressing reading for many trustees and directors who have raised huge
budgets to pay insurance costs for major shows in the past is Pfeffer's
conclusion that "the evidence indicates that fine arts insurance rates for
museums have been grossly excessive and that, with competition and
greater risk management awareness, better terms and conditions can be
18. Pfeffer, Insuring Museum Exhibitions, 27 HAsTINGs L.J. 1123, 1161-62 (1976).
19. Id. at 1162.
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obtained in the insurance market."2  Depressing for many insurance
executives will be Pfeffer's recommendations based on the British Indem-
nity Scheme, whereby our government would provide for indemnity as a
substitute for commercial insurance covering loans of artworks from
abroad that are deemed to be of national importance. (The Association
of Art Museum Directors is already working toward this policy.) As
another means of reducing costs he proposes enlarging reciprocal agree-
ments among major museums in different countries, as have been con-
cluded between the Metropolitan Museum of Art, the Louvre, and the
Hermitage.
Professor Pfeffer's essay has revelations for those interested in all
the bad things that can happen to a work of art, such as artnapping, and
that can cause its loss or destruction. The willingness of insurance
companies to pay ransoms actually encourages further theft. Many
destructive forces or agents are excluded from coverage in insurance
policies. One is also reminded of the considerable responsibility placed
on museum curators to safeguard art not just from theft but from
damage due to faulty restoration or the inherent vice caused by the artist
who joins improper or incompatible materials in his composition. The
author makes clear the intricacies of the insurance market, special
problems in exhibition underwriting, and what does and does not go
into rate making. This last leads to the devastating comment, "In the
field of fine arts, an insurance company can do with rates pretty much
what it feels any particular organization deserves."'" Although ad-
dressed to museums, the article gives valuable advice to collectors such
as that in case of loss, they have the burden of justifying evaluations
readily accepted by insurance companies. Pfeffer gives important ad-
vice to museums on clauses that can be inserted in a contract to the
institution's benefit. Valuable to those who would work for changes in
the present insurance system is the summarization of federal indemnity
approaches in Britain and this country. Of interest to academics as well
as museum administrators will be Pfeffer's discussion of a newly emerg-
ing profession, that of risk management, in which "[tlhe risk manager's
job is to analyze risk control and risk finance by means of a form of re-
search inquiry which adopts a benefit/cost approach." 22
Art museum directors are more familiar with managing the risks of
acquiring fakes. Rare is the director who has not had nightmares about
20. Id. at 1148.
21. Id. at 1148, quoting C. KECK & H. BLOCK, I. CHAPMAN, J. LAWTiON, N.
STOLOW, A PRIMER ON MUSEUM SECURITY 16 (1966).
22. Pfeffer, Insuring Museum Exhibitions, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1123, 1136 (1976).
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this possibility and who has not seen bad dreams become reality. Un-
like the average collector, good museum directors are trained or know
from experience to enlist the aid of the most qualified experts, when
such exist, and to employ technicians when needed to detect frauds. Too
often, ambitious private collectors see the opportunity to make a good
buy that is not offered on the open market and carries no authentication
by recognized experts. Such collectors may be anxious to show up the
art experts. When these purchasers of frauds show their acquisitions to
scholars and are told that they are fakes, the former sometimes complain
of a conspiracy by the establishment to deny them the glory of making
an important find. Collectors should know that scholars universally
prefer the joy of discovering authentic art to the unpleasantness that may
accompany identification of fakes.
A skillful fake that has fooled the experts may cause the public or
graduate law students in an art and law course to question why it should
not be valued as much as authentic art. Why do we care about the
exposure of fakes? What is at stake? The preamble to the section on
attributions in the College Art Association Guidelines for the Profes-
sional Practice of Art History speaks to these questions: "The harm
that is done by the continued circulation of fakes and forgeries is to
truth, to the reputation of the artist, or to an older culture by misrepre-
sentation of the nature and quality of its art in the eyes of scholars and
the public. Fakes impair the value of authentic works of art in public
as well as private collections and distort the art market."2
In his Controlling the Artful Con: Authentication and Regula-
tion, Professor Leonard Du Boff writes about the various problems
presented by forgeries, the methods available for their detection, the
legislation which deals with this subject, and some old and new propos-
als to protect the consumer. For the uninitiated, his introduction is a
useful clarification of what constitutes a fake and a forgery. He em-
ployes familiar categories that comprise deliberate forgery, the innocent
making of copies that come to be confused with the original, and,
finally, the pastiche, embellished or posthumously completed work, all
made by a person other than the artist and intended to augment the
salability of the original object. Du Boff cites vivid examples including
that of the 18th century sculptor who was helpless to stop the sale of his
work by the Louvre as the sculpture of a 15th century artist.
Without going into all of the problems confronted by scholars in
authentication, Du Boff calls attention to their subjectivity and then
23. See ART JouRNAL, Winter, 1975-76.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 27
discusses the limitations and possibilities of scientific tests. The diffi-
culties of obtaining expert opinion include the fact that museums may
not always provide authentication service, either as a matter of policy or
out of fear of becoming involved in controversies. Given the scope of
the history of art there are relatively few qualified experts to pass
judgment on much of it, and as the writer points out, they are often
reluctant to give an opinion for fear of legal reprisals. Recently, to
further encourage art historians to expose fakes, the College Art Associ-
ation (CAA) added to its Code of Ethics a reminder that as good
citizens, historians are obligated to report probable evidence of crime to
the appropriate authorities. To its Guidelines for Professional Practice,
the CAA also added advice on how to give attributions and avoid legal
24repercussions.
When Du Boff advocates the creation of a licensing scheme to
protect the public, I would take exception.2" To members of the public
seriously interested in identifying qualified experts, museums, scholars,
critics, dealers, and other collectors can often be of assistance. The
qualified experts are known by their track records and get their clients
by referral, as do many lawyers. Certification by bar associations did
not prevent the complicity of lawyers in Watergate. When Du Boff
writes that experts should be held to the highest standards of perform-
ance, he is on the side of the angels. When he writes, "They should be
required to document the reasons for their conclusions," '26 and else-
where, "Even stylistic experts can verbalize the facts upon which they
base their findings, 27 he shows unfamiliarity with the attribution
process. Certainly there are times when documentation and facts can
be produced. But when attribution depends upon quality, the art
connoisseur is like the wine expert. Ask the latter to document why a
certain vintage is poor. The language of esthetic experience is not the
language of verbal discourse, and often the expert can only report the
judgment of his instincts.
Du Boff argues that if art experts are "granted greater flexibility
with their decisions and immunity from suit, it is likely that their
standards will decline:' 2  I propose that not only is this result improba-
ble, but, as he himself points out, removal of the fear of legal controver-
24. See id.
25. Du Boff, Controlling the Artful Con: Authentication and Regulation, 27
HASTINS L.J. 973, 985-87 (1976).
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sy would encourage more museums and scholars to give attributions
when it is within their competence. Du Boff overlooks both that
professional pride of qualified experts will not allow conscious deterio-
ration of standards and that judgment of scholars is subjected to the
review of their colleagues. The quality of attribution a collector re-
ceives is usually directly related to the alertness and effort employed to
find the best source for this judgment.
After reviewing the scientific tests for forgeries, Du Boff examines
laws in several states and finds that they penalize the forger or fraudu-
lent seller but do not provide relief for the deceived buyer. The possible
applicability of the Uniform Commercial Code to provide this relief is
discussed, along with a review of the state laws in Michigan and New
York that supplement the Code. Among the familiar solutions to the
problem brought up by Du Boff are the idea for a central art registry,
patterned after the automobile licensing system (and recommended by
those advocating royalties for artists), and self-policing by the art com-
munity. A private licensing agency for art dealers is recommended, and
the author calls for an investigation of the "questionable practices"2 9 of
the International Foundation for Art Research.
Not discussed in this essay is the terrible problem of purging the art
world of recognized fakes that continue in circulation because the law
does not allow for their permanent confiscation. To the scholar there is
a paradox. An art forgery or fake is a crime. As citizens, we are
obligated to report crimes. When, however, I called the attention of the
local district attorney to Rodin forgeries in our county, I was told that
nothing could be done until there was a "victim" who had purchased
them under conditions that deliberately misrepresented their identity
and value -and who wanted legal redress. In the chapter "Disposition of
Fake Art" in their Art Works: Law, Policy, Practice,° Feldman and
Weil reprint the report of a committee from the New York Bar Associa-
tion that discusses possible remedies for the problem while coming out
against confiscation. These remedies are not encouraging, and the
absence of a reasoned argument against confiscation is disappointing.
The College Art Association encourages scholars to urge owners of
fakes and forgeries to donate them voluntarily to willing museums that
have study collections of frauds.
29. Id. at 1020.
30. Art Committee, The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Disposi-
tion of Fake Art, 26 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 591 (1971), in F. FELDMAN & S.E. WEIL,
ART WoRKs: LAW, POLICY, PRAcflCE 1079 (1974).
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The average museumgoer has no idea of how and where a
museum acquires its treasures. Until recently, practically no one cared.
Few among the public are aware of the role played by thieves, smug-
glers, and art dealers in finding, moving, researching, and making
available to museum directors art from all over the world. It is doubtful
that many law students are aware of the role an attorney can play in a
major museum in connection with the acquisition of important works of
art. If a poll were taken today in which respondents were asked,
'Which artist made the front page of the New York Times for twelve
consecutive days?," the most frequently cited name would probably be
Picasso, rather than the late sixth century B.C. Greek vase painter
Euphronios. In a long awaited and absorbing essay, Ashton Hawkins,
Secretary and Counsel of the Metropolitan Museum of Art, writes about
all of the above in connection with the worldwide press coverage of that
museum's acquisition in 1972 for one million dollars of an ancient
Greek bowl used for mixing wine and water, known as the Euphronios
krater. It is not an overstatement for Hawkins to write, "The attention
given this purchase by the press and controversy which followed were of
a magnitude and intensity unprecedented in the annals of the Metropoli-
tan Museum." 3' The ingredients that fueled world interest included a
rare work by the greatest vase painter of ancient Greece, one of the
world's greatest museums, a record price for a Greek painted pot,
charges reported by the New York Times that it had been illegally
excavated from an Etruscan tomb in Cerveteri, Italy, and hence the
involvement of the Italian police and courts, its previous possession by a
Lebanese art merchant, and minimal information on its history, which
could be traced back only to 1920, according to the aforementioned
previous owner. Already in the public's mind at the time was the Met's
recent history of dubious sales and exchanges of important works of art
and international concern over theft and illegal export of national
treasures. Hawkins separates the controversy into two parts: the pub-
lic aspect, including the charges in the press, and the legal aspect, which
"led the Metropolitan to examine the conflicting evidence concerning
the Krater's provenance." 2
In their anxiety to acquire a masterpiece, many museums in the
past have not been too concerned with the questions of ethics, legality,
and source or history of prior ownership of the works in question. Some
persons have argued that great art belongs to the world, and, regardless
31. Hawkins, The Euphronios Krater at the Metropolitan Museum: A Question
of Provenance, 27 HASTNs LJ. 1163 (1976).
32. Id. at 1171.
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of their country of origin, movable objects should be housed in countries
whose museums can insure their preservation for humanity. This "to the
wealthiest go the spoils" argument has naturally served to spur interna-
tional looting. Readers of Mr. Hawkin's article will be alerted to the
Italian "profession" of tomb robbing; during the controversy over the
Euphronios krater one of the most notorious tombaroli was even inter-
viewed on television because he claimed to have seen part of this object
when it was being looted from an Etruscan tomb. This acknowledged
thief was momentarily a national celebrity, and his testimony was used
by Italian law enforcement agencies! What also emerged to public view
during the controversy was the fact that archaeologists can themselves
contribute to our ignorance of important works of art and be detrimen-
tal to their preservation by not reporting the existence of parts of
excavated objects that lie neglected in the basements of museums all
over the world. Often fragments from the same object will be dispersed
in the museums of different countries. The reluctance of the Italian
government to publish photographs of disputed fragments in their pos-
session clouded the issue and still impedes our knowledge of the possible
existence of another work by Euphronios.
Hawkins writes of the complexities of a case involving separate
court actions against the dealer intermediary, related to the Italians'
feelings of guilt and frustration over the astounding loss of national art
treasures during a long period of time, and the way apparently unrelated
events were suddenly linked by the press to the museum's purchase. He
notes, "From the museum's perspective, the story seemed to be turning
into a drama with a life of its own, not unlike a play by Pirandello. ' 33
In this article, which for the first time lays out in detail the
chronology and multiple aspects of the case, Hawkins concludes that the
facts "laid to rest any reasonable questions about the lawfulness of the
means by which" 34 the museum acquired the Euphronios krater. A
fair question is why an international uproar should sometimes be re-
quired for a major museum to make known to the public the provenance
of a great work of art. What will it take for the Metropolitan Museum
of Art, for example, to acknowledge fully by exhibition and publication
all 219 pieces of a great collection of ancient silver objects, referred to as
the "Lydian Horde," reportedly acquired from an art dealer between
1966 and 1968? According to a classical archaeologist, Dr. Kenan T.
Erim, an experienced excavator in Turkey, these objects must have been
33. Id. at 1170.
34. Id. at 1178.
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part of an illegally excavated trove from a tomb in Lydia. Using his
own present contribution as a model, we can only look forward to a
similar future effort by Mr. Hawkins in connection with the secretive-
ness of the Metropolitan Museum of Art's acquisition and holding of
this Lydian treasure.
Anyone who assumes that archaeology is remote from contempo-
rary international politics has not read the newspapers and been aware
of UNESCO's treatment of Israel in 1974 over excavations which it
conducted in Jerusalem and which were protested by the Arab nations.
Professor James A. R. Nafziger writes about the politicization of
global cultural development, the fragility of UNESCO's international
legal framework for facilitating such developments, and the ways col-
lapses of this framework like the one in 1974 might be prevented in the
future. For Professor Nafziger the UNESCO resolutions that denied
Israel's request to be included in UNESCO's European regional group
and invited the director-general of UNESCO "to withhold assistance
from Israel in the fields of education, science and culture ' 35 raise the
questions of "the appropriateness of the dispute-settlement techniques
and sanctions relied upon by UNESCO ' 30 and "alternative modes of
responding to international conflict involving cultural property. 3" The
excavations are discussed against the background of the Hague Conven-
tion of 1954 and several UN and UNESCO resolutions. Nafziger finds
that "it is difficult to apply the convention to Israel's non-military
archaeological activity."3 8 Crucial to this finding is the definition of the
word "preservation." As so often has happened in the Middle East, a
lack of communication between the Israelis and Jordanians over their
interpretations of the convention was, according to the author, a root of
the problem. There was no recourse to a third party, a failure which
suggests that when he retires as Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger
might have a second career as a mediator in archaeological disputes
between nations. Although Israel did not abide by UNESCO injunc-
tions, the legal basis for the UNESCO response to Israel was clouded,
and Nafziger argues the dispute should have rested upon a "cooperative,
programmatic approach to the dispute '39 clearly set forth in the UNES-
35. Nafziger, UNESCO-Centered Management of International Conflict over Cul-
tural Property, 27 HAsiNGs LJ. 1051, 1053 (1976), quoting UNESCO Doc. 18
C/VR 39, 124.9, 124.10 (prov. ed. 1974).
36. Nafziger, UNESCO-Centered Management of International Conflict over Cul-
tural Property, 27 HAsTNGs L.J. 1051, 1055 (1976).
37. Id. at 1055.
38. Id. at 1058.
39. Id. at 1065.
May 19761
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
CO Constitution. The generally responsible way Israel conducted its
excavations was ignored in favor of legalistic interpretations. Nafziger
finds the first UNESCO resolution against Israel acceptable on the
merits but the second legally dubious and unwise. Overall, the author
concludes that UNESCO missed opportunities to demonstrate leadership
in conflict management.
While Professor Nafziger deals with the protection of archaeologi-
cal activity during peacetime, Professor Stanislaw E. Nahlik examines
the problem of "International Law and the Protection of Cultural
Property in Armed Conflicts." Reviewing the Kellogg Pact and rules of
war prior to 1954, Professor Nahlik gives us a summary treatment of
modern attempts to protect cultural property against destruction and
pillage. Reviewing the Hague conventions before 1954, he feels that
some of the loopholes pertaining to destruction of cultural property by
airpower could be closed but that the basis for adequate protection is
found in the 1907 Hague regulations. Much of the essay is devoted to
the Hague Convention of 1954 and what the writer feels are its advan-
tages and disadvantages. Under the former he lists the widening of the
scope of protection to include all forms of armed conflict even when not
of an international character and the broadening of the coverage of
cultural property to include buildings or "centres containing monu-
ments."" °  One of the new aspects of coverage that is particularly
nettlesome because its interpretation depends on someone's judgment is
that which gives special protection to immovable objects of "very great
importance,"'" such as monuments or museums, provided they are
"situated at an adequate distance from any large industrial centre or
from any important military objective .... "12 An International
Register of Cultural Property Under Special Protection43 is maintained
by the director-general of UNESCO. Provisions were made for observ-
ers to be appointed by belligerent powers to assist them in protecting
their cultural heritages during war. Among the disadvantages cited by
40. Nahlik, International Law and the Protection of Cultural Property in Armed
Conflicts, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1069, 1078 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Nahlik], quot-
ing Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict, done May 14, 1954, art. 1, 249 U.N.T.S. 242.
41. Nahlik, supra note 40, at 1080, quoting Convention for the Protection of Cul-
tural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, done May 14, 1954, art. 8, para. 1, 249
U.N.T.S. 246.
42. Id. (emphasis added).
43. Nahlik, supra note 40, at 1080.
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Professor Nahlik are the problems of restitution, and he reminds us that
in recent wars "the guilty party had to deliver objects similar in kind and
value."4' An obvious question here is whether or not true equity is
established, as those intangible qualities that comprise one nation's
national treasure are rarely transferable to another nation, and the result
may be that both nations lose. (If a national treasure is so designated
because it cannot be replaced, where is the equity in the foregoing
arrangement when value is determined in kind?) The introduction of a
"military necessity" 45 clause to exempt belligerent nations from respect-
ing each other's cultural property, introduced at the insistence of the
United States and Britain, was reluctantly acceded to by western and
socialist countries. Nahlik sees this as a dangerous provision and points
out that the United States has never signed the Hague Convention of
1954. As a footnote to Professor Nahlik's essay, a 1972 letter from
Ronald J. Bettauer, an attorney in the Office of the Legal Adviser to the
Secretary of State, sent to Mrs. Anne Coffin Hanson, my predecessor as
president of the CAA, affirms that the reason the United States could
not agree to the Hague convention "is that adherence to the Convention
would seriously limit the options of the United States in the event of
nuclear war or even in some cases of conventional bombardment." 46 In
what might be translated as an argument for the teaching of art history
at all American military academies, Professor Nahlik expresses the
"hope that at least the commander of a division will know enough about
art history not to destroy an object of major importance.' 7 The writer
is also discouraged with the provisions for using UNESCO to watch over
the implementation of the convention. In sum, Professor Nahlik re-
minds us of the fact that no Anglo-Saxon countries have ratified the
treaty and few entries are found in the UNESCO International Register
of important monuments. He calls for a new meeting of the parties to
correct the oversights and disadvantages to which he has called atten-
tion.
Dr. Halina Nie6 surveys the present state of the protection of
cultural property in many countries throughout the world and argues
that any international regulation in this area must take account of the
44. Id. at 1083.
45. Id. at 1084, quoting Convention with Other Powers Respecting Laws and
Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2279 (1911); Regulations Respecting
the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2302 (1911).
46. Letters to the Editor, APT JouRNAL, Summer, 1957, at 488.
47. Nahlik, supra note 40, at 1086.
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variety of legal systems developed by different countries to safeguard
their national treasures. France was one of the first nations to take
legal steps to protect its cultural patrimony, and although it has devel-
oped a sophisticated and imitable system, Dr. Nie6 points to such
lacunae as the fact that the art in the Louvre does not come under la
protection domaniale.48 This classification depends upon the vagueness
and variability of what is considered in the public interest."9 That
commerce can interfere with the protection of cultural property in
France is attested to by that country's fear of losing an important role on
the world art market; hence its flexible export policy. The basis of
England's selection or "scheduling" of works of national interest, largely
immovable objects, is summarized along with the criteria for export. Dr.
Nie6 concludes that the British system of granting export licenses is less
effective than the French system in preserving the integrity of cultural
heritage, as the British system depends upon the financial resources of
public museums to acquire works in dispute.50 Of particular interest to
American art collectors is the British provision to exclude from estate
duty cultural property of national, scientific, historic, or artistic interest
as long as the particular object is not sold or exported abroad or is sold
to a national institution in Britain.
Poland integrates its customs provisions with the legal system for
the protection of cultural property, and customs officials may confiscate
works imported or exported without proper documents. All movable
and immovable objects, whether they belong to the state or to certain
private parties, are included in the government register. The Law of
1962 places restrictions on private ownership that in civil law are called
impoverishment of owners' rights. When a given object or book is
registered, the owner "is obligated to offer it for sale to national mu-
seums or national libraries."'" In principle the exportation of cultural
property is prohibited. Works of art, crafts, and books made since May
9, 1945, are exempt. Dr. Nie6 discusses instances in which works of art
were confiscated and repatriated by Polish customs.
In the Middle East, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, and Libya use the year
1700 as the borderline between protected and nonprotected cultural
property, and Egypt uses the year 1879. Hence the date of the work of
art is crucial to whether it is protected from export. These dates
48. Nie6, Legislative Models of Protection of Cultural Property, 27 HASTINGS LJ.
1089, 1094 (1976).
49. Id. at 1094-95.
50. Id. at 1097-98.
51. Id. at 1100.
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indicate, according to the author, the preference of the countries for pre-
Arabic and Arabic culture before European influence. Syria empowers
the General Directorate of Antiquities and Museums "to expropriate any
movable and immovable cultural property if it is in the interest of the
State to do so."' 52 The licensing and punishment of offending art
dealers is recounted.
Dr. Nie6 sees international regional cooperation in the Far East as
being still marginal; protection depends upon internal laws. Using
Japan as a model for this geographical area, the writer discusses the
1950 Law for the Protection of Cultural Properties and the influence of
international achievements on it. Of particular interest are what the
Japanese claim as national cultural properties aside from such tangible
treasures as buildings, pictures, and sculptures. Many areas of scenic
beauty valued for visual appreciation are protected. Intangible cultural
properties include the art and skill employed in drama, music, and the
applied arts, folk culture, manners and customs. In Japan certain
artists are thus considered to be the possessors of classified property.
Along with the possibility of confiscation, the Japanese government may
give subsidies to owners of national treasures if they are not able to keep
them in a proper state of preservation. The need for international
exchange may lead the export commission to decide in favor of export-
ing a work of important cultural property, but not a national treasure.
In Mexico the problems of poverty, lack of awareness of cultural
property, and inadequate government protection of historic sites have
contributed to illegal export. Mexican law is unusual in that it provides
the legal basis for recovery of illegally exported archaeological monu-
ments. The reasons American protection of its cultural property differs
from European systems are reviewed by Dr. Nie6 and make interesting
reading. Historical rather than esthetic value has been the basic criteri-
on for state protection in the United States, and the rule of private
property has allowed owners of classified historic monuments to do as
they pleased with them. Until the recent sale of major American artists'
works to Australia, the question of limiting export of important Ameri-
can art was not even raised, and it is not surprising that no laws inhibit
export. Nevertheless, Dr. Nie6 discovered in connection with the recent
export of major works by the Metropolitan Museum of Art that "author-
ities can intervene to meet the demands of the public interest. '53 Better
known to this readership is the fact that the United States is one of the
52. Id. at 1105.
53. Id. at 1114.
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few countries prohibiting importation of illegally exported cultural prop-
erty from Mexico, and in the case of other Latin American countries, of
monumental Pre-Columbian architectural sculpture.
In reviewing African protection of national treasures, the author
points to the influence of past colonial laws, especially those of the
British in Malawi. In the summary, Dr. Nied points to the problems of
establishing international regulations on the recovery of illegally export-
ed cultural property and the alienation of an object outside the borders
of the state to which it belongs. Specific cases are discussed, as are
various means, including the "pressuring of other nations," 54 to resolve
these disputes. The essay ends by comparing the ingenuity of certain
thieves to that of the artist himself-so that in this collection of essays
the artist has emerged as a model both for lawyers and for crooks!
54. Id. at 1121.
